Deliberate Apathy—Arming America's Pilots Against Terrorism

By Captain David Mackett

On the morning of 9/11, I was an off-duty airline captain, ‘hitching a ride’ in the cockpit jumpseat of an American Airlines MD-80, en route to Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW). It was just as beautiful a day at 35,000 feet, as it was on the ground in New York and Washington D.C. The duty pilots kept one ear on the comfort of the routine radio chatter, and the other, for easy banter about schedules and headwinds, as we rode a silver dream through a crystal sky.

At 9:55 am, as I and the two pilots discussed whether they should start our descent early to avoid an area of light turbulence, the radio became eerily silent. Air traffic control suddenly stopped responding to aircraft calls. A few moments later, a controller said cryptically, over the radio, “All aircraft, we have a national emergency... All aircraft prepare for emergency diversion instructions for immediate landing.” ‘All aircraft?’ We tried to wrap our minds around the impact of what the controller was saying, but then, the words that stopped us cold: “All aircraft—beware cockpit intrusion!” It was the first time in a 17-year flying career that I’d ever heard a controller’s voice shake.

Already, scores of innocent people had been murdered on the ground, and colleagues that I had shared the rarest of careers with had died helplessly at the hands of madmen—fighting bare handed to their last breath to save their aircraft. Thousands more would die before noon—armed, suicidal terrorists had taken control of commercial airliners. No one beyond six years old would ever look at the shining skyline of New York again with the same bright eyes.

The next hours of my life that day will be so perfectly placed in my memory, I will never be able to forget them. It could have been me. Unlike every other emergency I have ever prepared for, I wouldn’t have had the tools to stop it—well-trained, suicidal terrorists were targeting our airliners. Airport security was a bad punch line; I knew virtually all of our flights were defenseless. Bad as it was, there was an unspoken truth only whispered about in dark corners of industry and government: Al-Qaeda was still out there and the next attack might be far, far worse.

If 9/11 had occurred only a few hours later, the World Trade Center’s twin-towers could have had 30,000 workers inside. If United Airlines flight 93, which crashed in southern Pennsylvania, had not been delayed taking off, thousands more in Washington D.C., might have been killed, as the flight’s hero passengers would not have learned of its target in time to stop it. If Al-Qaeda had targeted a nuclear power plant or Hoover Dam, the result might have been unspeakable loss—an area hundreds of miles across, uninhabitable for years. Unfortunately, this is the threat we still face.

Opposition to defending our skies

It only took a week before the call to train professional airline pilots with the tools they needed to defend their aircraft—firearms—went up loud and wide with massive support. Answering the public, two months after 9/11, Congress passed the groundbreaking Aviation and Transportation Security Act, which, in addition to creating the Transportation Security Administration, allowed, but didn’t require TSA to train airline pilots to carry firearms to protect their cockpits against attacks.

However, 75 percent of the American people, and 85 percent of airline pilots, as well as an overwhelming bipartisan majority of Congress, suddenly found they faced some unlikely opposition to implementing this aspect of the new law. The Air Transport Association, an advocacy organization that supports the airlines’ managements, began working to prevent pilots from being able to defend passengers or the cockpit against terrorist attackers. While the airlines’ CEOs happily took their passengers’ money though, and blithely assured the public that flying was safe again, they did everything in their power to keep those same passengers defenseless.

Administration officials then mirrored the airlines’ lobbying position. In spring 2002, Bush administration spokesperson Gordon Johndroe said that the Administration opposed guns in the cockpit saying it was because of “the potential for handguns getting loose on airplanes.” However, Johndroe didn’t mention how that might happen. TSA Undersecretary John Magaw proclaimed that he wouldn’t allow commercial airline pilots or any other flight deck crew to have access to firearms as a last line of defense against terrorist hijackers.

The illusion of airline security

It was in the face of this bureaucratic paralysis that pilots from several major airlines formed the Airline Pilots Security Alliance (APSA), a nonprofit, security working group dedicated to developing unbiased, apolitical information on solutions to the new terrorist threat. Pilots realized that they, as frontline professionals were in a unique position to see through what was becoming known in the industry as, “The Greatest Show on Earth”—the illusion of airline security. Knowing they would share the fate of their passengers if they couldn’t defend them, 40,000 airline pilots joined APSA’s cause. Airline pilots knew how porous the airline security system was—still is.

A college student who successfully planted weapons and simulated explosives on five Southwest Airlines aircraft, after warning TSA he would do it via an email sent some five weeks earlier, testing our nation’s security, demonstrated the ease in which contraband can be smuggled onto airliners. If TSA couldn’t catch a kid who warned them in advance, how did it hope to thwart motivated terrorists? The fact is on any given day, carbon fiber knives, guns, poison pens, explosives, etc., can slip past airport screeners; often they do. Metal detectors and x-ray machines cannot detect plastic weapons, and unless an Explosives Detection Systems machine randomly screens a bag, explosives can slip by screeners as well.

Checkpoint screening is only part of the problem. As passengers wait in long lines for TSA screening, airline ground employees, using alternate entrances, still legally bypass security numerous times each day, on the strength of a background check that most of the 9/11 terrorists would have passed. As every major airport is a virtual city unto itself, catering trucks, construction crews, airport suppliers and vendors, also pass in and out of secure areas by the hundreds with only cursory searches.

Spurious arguments

On Sept. 5, 2002, CEOs of every major airline signed a common letter, objecting to arming pilots. Collectively they said, “Intentionally introducing thousands of deadly weapons into the system appears to be dangerously counter-productive.” The CEOs knew the armed pilot program envisioned that pilots would only use firearms in the cockpit, when a terrorist breach meant certain death as the only alternative. The CEOs also knew they routinely sold tickets to thousands of federal, state and local law enforcement officers who legally carried loaded, concealed guns in their aircraft cabins.

CEOs wrote: “We believe the public must know what studies or testing have been conducted to determine the effects of an accidental weapon discharge in a pressurized aircraft at altitude, or discharge into a sophisticated instrument panel.” Their argument was disingenuous; studies had already proved that even multiple bullets through a fuselage or an instrument panel wouldn’t compromise the integrity of an aircraft. The airlines’ chief executives knew that a tiny bullet hole was simply a nonevent. Why they believed it was safe for air marshals, but not pilots to carry guns, wasn’t explained. Yet, the airlines’ created a “Hollywood scenario,” which Congress and the public bought—as if it were real.

All second-guessing done by airline management and TSA ignored one unassailable fact; if terrorists successfully got into the cockpit, everyone was dead anyway. Their clever sound bites, “the pilot’s job is to fly the airplane,” forgot to mention it was tough sledding— when the pilot’s throat was slit!

The antipathy of airlines' management was puzzling, since arguably the airline industry had the most to lose in the event of another attack. They’d already lost billions of dollars on 9/11, and most were relying on a government bailout funded by the American taxpayer to remain afloat. Several airlines would likely disappear forever in the event of another attack. Even more puzzling was a failure of the airlines to see that they could turn massive public support for an armed-cockpit into a competitive discriminator; 49 percent of airline passengers in national polls said they would actually choose an airline for the fact that its pilots were armed.

Instead, the ATA vigorously argued that new fortified cockpit doors would keep terrorists out. Yet, a drunken passenger was able to easily breach the new door on a United Airlines flight soon after it was installed, an act the ATA called “a fluke.” However, when an after-hours cleaning crew on a bet one night, drove an airline food cart right through a fortified cockpit door several months later, the ATA was curiously silent.

Even the fortified cockpit door must be routinely opened during flight to provide access to the crew. Terrorists don’t have to break it open—they just need to await the opportunity to rush the cockpit while the door is open. If it happened before, it can happen again. Once an attacker gets behind the cockpit door, without a pilot’s firearm instantly available, a successful massacre is assured, as the passengers are now trapped outside, unable to assist.

Why do we need armed pilots? Don’t we have air marshals on flights? The fact was, still is—there are 35,000 flights per day in the United States. It would take a force of air marshals the size of the U.S. Marine Corps to cover them all and would cost $13 billion per year! The odds of actually having an air marshal on your flight are about the same as having a celebrity onboard.

40,000 pilot-volunteers to fly armed

Throughout 2002, in an effort to get new legislation passed that would compel
TSA to arm pilots, APSA met with Congress to brief them on the reality of the threat and the urgency of arming pilots. Notwithstanding the boxes of sewing needles and scissors TSA was now showing off, taken from unsuspecting passengers who were not trying to hide them, the possibility of motivated terrorists successfully getting weapons onto airliners was still significant.

Finally, in Dec. 2002, an overwhelming bipartisan majority of legislators, working with APSA, passed a new law that forced TSA to arm volunteer pilots, and removed the airline managements’ choice in the matter in favor of the passengers’ lives and the nation’s security. The Arming Pilots Against Terrorism Act was made part of the Homeland Security Act.

Unfortunately, on the eve of the law’s passage, cargo pilots were stripped from eligibility. This was especially distressing because cargo airliners usually didn’t have doors to their cockpits and perimeter security on cargo ramps was lax enough to easily allow a stowaway aboard. Cargo airlines also routinely transported recently hired ground employees in seats right behind the pilots. Additionally, cargo airliners hold more fuel in many cases than their passenger-configured counterparts. It would take a full year and a new law, to get cargo pilots back into the program.

With the passage of the Homeland Security Act, 40,000 passenger pilots voiced their interest in volunteering to defend their flight decks against terrorism. For no compensation whatsoever, pilots agreed to undergo grueling federal law enforcement training on their own time, at their own expense and by doing so, they agreed to forgo a week’s pay. APSA and airline pilots’ unions began collecting contact information of interested pilots to forward to TSA in helping establish the new training program, but TSA refused the collected data from APSA. It was the first sign that TSA would make it difficult to apply.

Deliberate apathy

Stung by Congress’ overriding their refusal to arm commercial airline pilots, TSA bureaucrats decided instead to sabotage the program.

First Officer Dean Roberts, a former federal law enforcement officer for 23 years, testified before Congress that a TSA attorney said he would interpret the armed pilots legislation in such a way, “that no pilot in his right mind would volunteer.” That’s exactly what happened.

TSA independently added its own requirements to Congress’ law. They stipulated that pilots would have to undergo multiple layers of psychiatric testing and background checks to even participate in the program. In an effort to thwart pilot training, TSA tried to intimidate pilot-applicants by threatening to share its subjective judgments of a pilot’s competence with his or her employer, as well as with the Federal Aviation Administration. The screening was far in excess of that given to air marshals; pilots are already screened rigorously and regularly to maintain their flight qualifications. Air marshals could be hired and trained “off the street.”

Then, TSA began using its self-styled psychiatric screens to deliberately eliminate, and insult highly qualified pilots. Their message was clear when they eliminated former federal, state and local law enforcement agents, as well as a large pool of military pilots who were cleared to carry nuclear weapons and carry pistols; pilots who were still serving our country in the U.S. Armed Forces were also eliminated. Because of that, almost 90 percent of the original volunteers changed their minds and decided not to participate in TSA’s program.
TSA—roadblocks and doublespeak

April 2003, TSA held its first Federal Flight Deck Officer prototype class.
The class’ roster consisted of former law enforcement officers, as well as ex- military agents who had become airline pilots. During the course of training, TSA abruptly dismissed some of the pilots from the program. Two of the applicants that had been ousted from the program, only one hour before graduation, had successfully completed, and passed the tactical training requirements. TSA, to this day, has refused to explain the abrupt dismissals.

In what would become typical doublespeak for TSA, they claimed the pilots were dropped from the program, because they “hadn’t completed the course!”

Evaluations filled out by pilot-students, almost universally excoriated TSA bureaucrats who visited from Washington D.C.; students viewed TSA as hostile and arrogant. At the same time, pilots gave high praise to local tactical instructors as being motivated and knowledgeable; they judged tactical training as being outstanding. Similarly, TSA’s firearm instructors gave pilots who attended training high praise and said they were the most professional, trainable and mature class of any kind they’d ever taught.

When students praised TSA’s local instructors, TSA bureaucrats fired Willie Ellison, their well thought of director, for giving a welcome dinner to the class, and handing out baseball caps with the FFDO logo on them.

FFDO volunteers who remained in the program found that while they would be deputized as federal law enforcement officers, they wouldn’t be treated as such; they had to transport their weapons in lockboxes, if they weren’t actually on duty inside the cockpit. TSA explained that FFDOs only had jurisdiction in the cockpit.

As a standard practice, federal law allows thousands of law enforcement officers, town deputies for example, who have absolutely no authority on commercial airliners, to routinely carry concealed, loaded firearms in aircraft cabins. However, deputized “federal” pilots under TSA’s mandate are required to lock up weapons in a box, and place them in the belly of the aircraft when they travel. All other federal officers are already permitted to carry concealed weapons inside aircraft cabins.

TSA also refused to issue pilots standard federal credentials for identification. With a straight face, TSA justified this saying they were concerned FFDOs might use badges to “get out of traffic tickets.” The pilots were incredulous!

The FFDO program, now a shell of what Congress originally intended, officially started in July 2003. TSA’s original federal training facility in Georgia was relocated to New Mexico, a four-hour drive from the nearest airline-served city. Despite the fact there were 100,000 airline pilots in the U.S., TSA was only capable of training about 46 FFDOs a week.

Pilots threatened for blowing the whistle

Two years after Congress first told TSA to arm pilots, TSA Director James Loy, enthusiastically, testified to Congress that the FFDO program was a “success story.” On that day, only about 62-armed pilots were on duty to protect 35,000 flights. The rest of the pilots were being screened by airport security—making sure they couldn’t take over an airplane—five minutes before they were given control of one!

Soon after, DHS warned the public of a “significant risk of a terrorist attack,” based on “credible intelligence” that Al-Qaeda was targeting airliners. While DHS’s “orange” alert lasted weeks, multiple flights were cancelled. Additionally, the U.S. government insisted on having armed “officers” on international flights, while the program to arm America’s pilots languished. In the same two years that the FBI had fielded thousands of new agents, each requiring three months of training, TSA had managed to train only a handful of armed pilots.

TSA’s implementation of the program was so poor, FFDOs who had lived through TSA’s deliberate bungling of the program for months, contacted Congress about the fact that in a heightened state of alert, TSA was sabotaging the arming of pilots. Unbelievably, TSA threatened FFDOs with fines and dismissal from the program for doing so; ironically, the American public assumed that vast numbers of pilots were armed. In the face of a now angry Congress, TSA retracted its threats to FFDOs, but the damage was already done.

Rep. Joe Wilson (R-S.C.), saying it was “the last straw,” promised to write yet another law, specifically codifying Congress’ original intent and get large numbers of pilots armed using standard protocol and remove TSA’s roadblocks. In concert with APSA, Sen. Jim Bunning (R-Ky.) had already been working on similar legislation with other representatives. Sen. Barbara Boxer (D-Calif.) and Sen. Bob Smith (R-N.H.), both cosponsored the original armed pilots law.

New legislation

New legislation, “The Cockpit Security Technical Corrections Act of 2004” is pending introduction to Congress. If passed, this legislation will finally result in a strong first line of deterrence and last line of defense to the next cockpit intrusion. This is a much-needed layer of security—between the next 9/11— and the alternative of military fighter jets shooting down innocent airliners because pilots’ weren’t armed to stop terrorists from taking over the aircraft. Under passage of the bill, tens of thousands of pilots would become trained to defend their passengers against terrorism using standard, proven procedures. Furthermore, it will remove TSA’s power to dismiss qualified pilots from the program; it will prevent them from discouraging thousands of volunteers. It will make our skies much safer.

The deep-pocketed Air Transport Association and the agency charged with maintaining airline security will probably oppose it. However, a massive outcry from the public, threatening to fly only once our pilots are armed could win the day.

The horrible events of 9/11 have changed our country forever, but the fact remains that well-trained, suicidal terrorists are still targeting our airliners. Airport security is still a bad punch line, and until our pilots are armed, virtually all of our flights will remain defenseless.

David Mackett, president of the Airline Pilots Security Alliance, is an active major airline captain with 23 years of flying experience. APSA is a nonprofit 40,000-member security-working group, made up of airline pilots from all major airlines, which is dedicated to providing real solutions to airline terrorism. APSA relies on donations to continue its work and spokespersons are available to speak on the state of airline security and the continuing threat of terrorism by prior arrangement.

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